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DRAFT

C O P Y

SOVIET ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES IN POST-TREATY  
AUSTRIA.

Major economic stipulations of the peace treaty with respect to the USSR.

Cession of properties within the Austrian economy

Petroleum properties

Shipping properties

Other (if any)

Financial Obligations to the USSR

Cash payments

Other

Importance of permanent economic foothold obtained by USSR

Magnitude of concessions within the industrial sector

Operation of the Soviet properties

Influence exercised through

Operational policies

Financial manipulations (internal and with respect to  
foreign trade and currencies)

Personnel policies

The economic foothold as a wedge to general penetration of the  
Country.

The opening up of intelligence sources

Influence on labor policies 08

Close contact with Austrian population

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Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 18 Nov 49

To: D/No  
Publications  
From: ~~Staff Intelligence~~ Division, Projects Planning *REL*  
Subject: Guerrilla warfare capabilities in Iceland

Statement of Project

Origin:

Problem: To estimate the capabilities of the people of Iceland for guerrilla warfare in support of landings by United States forces.

Scope: Assumption: Prior occupation of the island by hostile forces.

Graphics (if any):

Form: Memorandum, to be drafted by D/No

Draft due in D/St: 30 Nov 49

Dissemination deadline  
(if any): 1 Dec 49

Responsible Branch: D/No

Internal Coordination: As needed

Departmental responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Top Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

DISPATCH USA EMBASSY TO BOSTON


1. Iceland
2. Guerrilla capabilities

DISPATCH USA EMBASSY TO BOSTON

DISPATCH USA EMBASSY TO BOSTON

ROUTING

25X1A



SECRET

IP-40

8 December 1949

**Subject:** Guerrilla warfare capabilities of the people of Iceland in support of landings by US forces.

**Assumption:** Prior occupation of the island by hostile forces

The capabilities of the people of Iceland for conducting guerrilla warfare in support of landings by US forces are negligible. The anti-militaristic temperament of the Icelandic people, their utter lack of knowledge as to the conduct of such activity, and the almost complete absence of arms and other necessary equipment preclude the formation of guerrilla forces. Iceland has no military forces, therefore her only possible sources of partially trained leaders for guerrilla activities are the Icelandic police and to a lesser extent the Fisheries Patrol Service. Each has a total strength of approximately 160 men. The police are reportedly 30 percent Communist infiltrated (although mostly in the lower ranks) and the Fisheries Patrol has had little applicable training. Even to these forces there are only a few small arms available and, with the Icelandic Communists probably having a very thorough knowledge of the identity and sympathies of all assigned personnel, their elimination soon after hostile occupation would undoubtedly occur. Although the non-Communist youth of Iceland have displayed some organized ability in assisting the police to control demonstrations, the transformation of such youth organizations into guerrilla forces is deemed highly improbable if not impossible considering the means at their disposal.